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A Combinatorial Auction-Based Collaborative Cloud Services Platform
Xiaowei Zhang, Bin Li , and Junwu Zhu
Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a combinatorial auction-based market model to enable Cloud Service
Providers (CSPs) to satisfy complex user requirements collaboratively, where the CSPs are connected in a social
network and communication costs among them cannot be ignored. However, in many situations CSPs may lie about
their private information in order to maximize their earnings. Therefore, we combine the combinatorial auction with
the VCG-auction mechanism to ensure that CSPs do not lie in auction. Based on above market model, we construct
a collaborative cloud platform, which is divided into three layers: The user-layer receives requests from end-users,
the auction-layer matches the requests with the cloud services provided by the Cloud Service Provider (CSP), and
the CSP-layer forms a coalition to improve serving ability to satisfy complex requirements of users. In fact, the aim
of the coalition formation is to find suitable partners for a particular CSP, and, we propose two heuristic algorithms
for the coalition formation. The Breadth Traversal Algorithm (BTA) and Revised Ant Colony Algorithm (RACA) are
proposed to form a coalition when bidding for a single cloud service in the auction.

The experimental results

show that RACA outperforms the BTA in bid price and our methods work well compared to the existing auctionbased method in terms of economic efficiency. Other experiments were conducted to evaluate the impact of the
communication cost on coalition formation and to assess the impact of iteration times for the optimal bidding price.
Key words: cloud computing; coalition formation; combinatorial auction; social network; communication cost
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Introduction

Currently, cloud computing has become a key
Information Technology (IT) buzzword due to its
abilities to offer flexible dynamic IT infrastructures,
Quality of Service (QoS) guaranteed computing
environments, and configurable software services[1, 2] .
In a cloud, resources (e.g., CPU and storage) are
provided as general utilities that can be leased and re Xiaowei Zhang, Bin Li, and Junwu Zhu are with
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Yangzhou 225009, China. E-mail: xwzhang@yzu.edu.cn;
jdkr@163.com.
 Bin Li is also with State Key Laboratory for Novel Software
Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China. Email: lb@yzu.edu.cn.
 To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Manuscript received: 2014-11-17; revised: 2014-12-28;
accepted: 2015-01-15

leased by users through the Internet in an ondemand
fashion. In a cloud computing environment, the
traditional role of the service provider is divided into
two: the infrastructure providers who manage cloud
platforms and lease resources according to a usagebased pricing model, and service provider who rent
resources from one or many infrastructure providers to
serve the end users. The emergence of cloud computing
has made a tremendous impact on the IT industry over
the past few years, where large companies such as
Google, Amazon, and Microsoft strive to provide more
powerful, reliable, and cost-efficient cloud platforms,
and business enterprises seek to reshape their business
models to benefit from this new paradigm. Indeed,
cloud computing provides several compelling features
that make it attractive to business owners.
However, the services provided by existing Cloud
Service Providers (CSPs) are relatively simple and
singular[3, 4] (such as CPU, storage, and network
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services), and extant work on cloud computing only
focuses on resource or task allocation[5–8] . Zhang
et al.[9] focused on dynamic resource provisioning
and heterogeneous types of Virtual Machines (VMs)
by combining a combinatorial auction with a linear
program without consideration of collaboration among
CSPs. Shi et al.[10] brought up an electronic auction
platform for a cloud, and proposed a continuous double
auction mechanism to match orders and facilitate
trading based on the platform. This was limited to
mechanism design and bidding strategies, but ignored
the communication and negotiation among different
CSPs. Guo et al.[11] modeled the bandwidth sharing
problem as a Nash bargaining game and allocated
tunable base bandwidth for VMs. Although the method
achieved efficient and fair bandwidth allocation, it
mainly focused on the IaaS layer. The promising
work[12] proposed a truthful online auction within a
cloud to satisfy heterogeneous user demands, and the
most significant difference in our work is that we strive
to make the CSPs collaborate efficiently when serving
cloud users other than for mechanism design to fulfill
different categories of user demands.
In many situations, most of above work cannot meet
the increasingly complex demands of users. In addition,
consumers are restricted to offerings from a single
provider at a time and hence, cannot simultaneously use
multiple or collaborative cloud services. To address the
problem mentioned above, Hassan et al.[13] proposed
a Combinatorial Auction (CA)-based cloud market
model that enables a dynamic cloud platform and a
Multi-Objective (MO) optimization model for partner
selection. However, CSPs are usually geographically
distributed and interrelated with each other to form a
social network in many real-world scenarios. Though
the method in Ref. [13] works well in terms of
economic efficiency, it did not take the interrelated
structure and the communication cost among CSPs
into consideration. Therefore, we strive to construct
a social network in CSPs, present a combinatorial
auction based collaborative cloud platform, and propose
BTA and RACA to form coalition based on the social
network. Moreover, we conduct a set of experiments
to evaluate the performance and scalability of the
proposed algorithm in terms of solution quality, and the
experimental results show that our methods work well
compared to the existing auction-based method in terms
of economic efficiency.

2
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Auction-Based Dynamic Collaborative
Platform
Auction-based cloud market model

Suppose an entrepreneur wishes to set up an online
store, and wants to rent all the necessary software and
hardware from a cloud. This will require the following
specific services:
(1) Website Center: responsible for each user’s
registration, logging in and out, business deals, and
maintenance of the store.
(2) Data Center: responsible for recording all of the
goods in the store, user data, and user order data.
(3) Logistics Center: responsible for shipping items
that the users purchased from the store, and recording
the freight status.
(4) Backup Center: responsible for backing up data
to ensure that the system can recover data lost, and
improve fault tolerance of the online store.
We assume that there are four CSPs: CSP1 can
provide Website Center service and Data Center
service, CSP2 can provide Logistics Center service,
CSP3 can provide Backup Center service, and CSP4
can provide Logistics Center service and Backup
Center service. We also assume that none of the
above CSPs can satisfy all of the requirements
independently. Therefore, they must collaborate to
fulfill the requirement by providing their local service
respectively if they each want to make a profit.
Generally, there are three roles in this scenario: user,
market/broker, and CSP. The broker will publish the
request to the market as soon as it has received it from
a user. Then, the market will save the request in the
request list (ReqList) until it is successfully matched
with a cloud service provided by its corresponding CSP.
Each CSP in the cloud market will access the ReqList
in every fixed time period for the requests it can satisfy.
It will bid on a request if it can make a profit by
providing the corresponding services. However, in the
scenario above, one single CSP is usually unable to
meet the increasingly complex user needs. Hence, a
CSP will search for collaborative partners in the cloud if
it has found a profitable request which it cannot satisfy
independently. Finding partners for a CSP is precisely
the process of coalition formation. The sponsor of the
coalition is called the master CSP, or pCSP.
The auction-based cloud market model considers
interrelated structure and communication cost among
CSPs whose main idea is inspired from Ref. [13]. As
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Fig. 2

Fig. 1

Auction-based cloud market model.

shown in Fig. 1, User1, User2, and User3 submit
Request1, Request2, and Request3 to the market/broker
respectively. CSP1 , CSP2 , CSP3 , and CSP4 connect to
each other to form a social network. The pCSP (CSP1
and CSP3 ) will find partners to form coalition when
it gets an appropriate request from the market. Once
the coalition is formed, the pCSP will negotiate with
members of the coalition to generate the ultimate bid
price, and send the bid price to the market. It should be
noted that the communication cost must be considered
when determining the bid price, because members
of the coalition must communicate (e.g., network
establishment and information transmission) while they
negotiating with each other. Actually, a CSP can
participate in different coalitions simultaneously (like
CSP4 in Fig. 1). The primary task of the market/broker
is to receive requests from users and bids from CSPs,
and match the requests to bids through its auction
policy. In this paper, we adopt a combinatorial auction
as the auction policy of the market, as it can yield higher
profits.
2.2

An example of a social network.

CSP a and CSP b can communicate with each other
directly.
If more than one CSP collaborate to provide services
to end users, they must negotiate with each other.
Hence, there must be communication cost while
collaborating and the communication cost can be
calculated as in Eq. (1).
C.i; j / D dis.i; j /  cost
(1)
In Eq. (1), C(i, j) represents the communication costs
when node i sends a message to node j, dis(i, j) means
the distance between i and j , and the “cost” is the unit
cost. As in Fig. 2, the cost of node a sending a message
to f is calculated as follows: C(a, f) = dis(a, f) cost =
2  cost. If the unit cost is 10, then C(a, f) = 20.
There are two auctions in our cloud market model.
The first one has the partners bidding for tasks from
pCSP while forming a coalition, and the second one
is that of the determined coalition bidding for users’
requests from the broker. In this paper, we combine
the combinatorial auction[14] with the second-price
sealed-bid auction to ensure that the CSP does not
lie in auction. Each CSP that has found suitable
requests from the market can sponsor a coalition by
finding appropriate partners within the social network.
The auction process of the cloud market model is

Auction strategy considering communication
cost

In fact, each CSP is usually distributed in different
geographic locations; they connect with each other
using the Internet and forming a social network. The
social network of CSPs can be defined as below.
Definition 1 (Social Network). A social network,
SN = (CSP, E), is a connected undirected graph, in
which the node represents the CSPs. Edge E = (i, j)
means that CSPi and CSPj can communicate with each
other directly without an intermediate node.
Figure 2 is an example of a social network in which

Fig. 3

The process of the auction.
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shown in Fig. 3. A user needs services S1 , S2 , and
S3 , and submits the request = (S1 , S2 , S3 ) to the
broker/market. All CSPs search the Request library of
the broker/market to find suitable requests to satisfy.
CSP1 can provide service S3 for $10, and can provide
a combinatorial service = fS1 , S3 g for $22. The price
of the combinatorial service = fS1 , S2 g of CSP3 is
$15 and the price of service S2 is $5. The price of the
combinatorial service = fS1 , S3 g of CSP2 is $20, and
the price of the service S3 is $15. In this case, CSP1 and
CSP2 establish the coalition fCSP1 , CSP3 g and fCSP2 ,
CSP3 g for request = (S1 , S2 , S3 ) respectively.
2.3
2.3.1

The framework of the Dynamic Collaborative
Cloud Platform (DCP)
The architecture of the DCP

The architecture of the DCP is shown in Fig. 4.
The DCP is divided into three layers: The user-layer
encompasses all end users that request services from
the cloud; the market-layer is responsible for receiving
requests from the users and bids from the CSPs, and
matching the requests with the bids through the auction
mechanism described in the above section; and the
CSP-layer is responsible for finding an appropriate
request from the market and forming a coalition to bid
for the request.
There are two functional modules and two libraries in
the market-layer. The main function of the information
publish module is publishing requests of end users
to the market data library. The auction module is
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responsible for getting the bids from the bids library,
matching the requests with bids, and determining which
CSP or coalition wins the bid.
The CSPs connect with each other and form a social
network in the CSP-layer. Each CSP not only contains
request searching, coalition formation, negotiation,
bid price evaluation, and profit assignment modules,
but also contains limited neighborhood data, history
data, and its own private data. The neighborhood data
includes its neighbor’s address, service types, price,
etc. The history data includes historical transaction
information about services of the CSP (such as price).
The private data includes the CSP’s value of a service
(or other private information) and cannot be revealed
to other CSPs. The coalition formation module will be
triggered to form a coalition if the pCSP cannot satisfy
a request, or if it can make more profit through coalition
formation.
Figure 5 is the associated sequence diagram about
the roles of the DCP, in which the user sends requests
for services to the broker, and the broker publishes the
requests as tasks to the tasks library. CSPs will select
the appropriate tasks from the task library, and initiate a
coalition if it cannot complete the task independently or
if it can profit more by forming a coalition. Hereafter,
the pCSP will negotiate with other CSPs in the coalition
to determine the coalition bidding price, and submit the
bids to the broker. All members of the coalition will
collaborate to provide services to the end user after the
coalition wins the bid.
2.3.2

The functional module of DCP

(1) Data storage
 Bids library, saves all bids of the CSPs or coalitions.

Fig. 4

The architecture of DCP.

Fig. 5

The associated sequence diagram of the participants.
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Each bid is expressed as a triple: bids = (coalition, task,
price), in which “coalition” identifies which coalition or
CSP owns the bid, “task” shows which task the coalition
or CSP bids for, and “price” is the bid price of providing
concrete services for the task.
 Neighborhood library, saves the neighbor’s
information of a CSP. Each CSP owns a neighborhood
library and all neighborhood libraries can be integrated
to form a social network of CSPs. This library is
updated in real time, recording when a neighbor of
the CSP joins or exits the network. The neighbor’s
information consists of the neighbor’s IP address,
services, the historical prices of its services, etc.
 Private data, saves all previous final prices for
providing services of the CSP. The private data is owned
by each CSP and cannot be accessed by all other CSPs.
 History data, saves all historical final transaction
prices of CSPs and can be accessed by all other CSPs.
 Task library, saves the requirements of the end
user as a task. A task consists of a number of
abstract services: task = (task ID, service1, service2,
   , servicen). Each abstract service needs a concrete
service to fulfill, and a task is accomplished, if and only
if, all its abstract services have been fulfilled.
(2) Information publish module. The module
is responsible for translating the user requests into
tasks and publishing the tasks into the task library.
As shown in Fig. 6, the broker will search for the
corresponding requirement template in the requirement
templates library once it receives the request from the
user. If it has found a matching template, it will publish
the template to the task library directly. Otherwise,
it will create the requirement template according to
the user’s request and save it into the template library.
Finally, the broker publishes the created template to the
task library.
(3) Task selecting module.
The collaboration
diagram of the CSPs is shown in Fig. 7. The CSPs

Fig. 6

Collaboration diagram of a broker and a user.

Fig. 7

Collaboration diagram of CSPs with a broker.

will search the task library, in a fixed time period, to
get the specific task on which to bid. If the task can be
accomplished independently, it bids on the task directly.
Otherwise, it will sponsor a coalition and negotiate with
the other members of the coalition to determine the
ultimate bid price.
(4) Coalition formation module. The coalition
formation module includes four sub-modules:
partner selecting module, negotiation module, profit
assignment module, and coalition evaluation module.
Figure 8 shows the process of the partner selection.
The pCSP will list all services it needs if it cannot
satisfy the task independently, and find partners
according to the above listed services through coalition
formation algorithms. The most important part of the
coalition formation algorithm is an auction mechanism
which will be described in detail in the next section.
In the process of coalition formation, the members
of the coalition change dynamically before the ultimate
coalition is determined. The reason is that the existing
members of the coalition will send collaborating
requests to its neighbors constantly and permit the
appropriate CSP to join the coalition. Two negotiators
will determine, by the negotiating algorithm and the
process of the negotiation, when a CSP joins into the

Fig. 8

The partner selection process.
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coalition.
Once a coalition is formed, the profit assignment
module will calculate the price that should be paid
to the members according to the bidding prices of
all the members. The overall bidding price of the
coalition is equal to the sum of the bidding prices of
all the members of the coalition. After the bidding
price is determined, the coalition evaluation module
will evaluate the bidding price and will package it with
the bid and send the bid to the broker if it is profitable.
Otherwise, the pCSP of the coalition will negotiate with
the other members to lower their bid prices.
(5) Auction module. Figure 9 shows the process of
the auction. The broker will trigger the auction process
when it receives all bids for a particular request (or in a
fixed time interval). The auction module matches the
bids with the request and determines which coalition
wins the bid. Then, the user can access the services of
the winning coalition directly and pay for the services
received. The broker will update the history data after
the transaction is completed.

3

Coalition Formation Algorithms

In this section, we formally describe the problem model
and the related concepts, and construct a social network
according to the specific application examples. Lastly,
we illustrate the process of coalition formation in detail.
3.1
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type Si is provided by CSPj . Cji represents the cost of
Si which is provided by CSPj . ji is the expected profit
of CSPj by providing service type Si .
 ST is the services set that a user T requested, and
ST  S .
 SG defines the serving ability of the coalition G
and contains all the service types that the coalition G
can provide. Apparently, SG  S and G = fCSPj j
j = 1,    , mg, G  CSP. Gj indicates that CSPj is
contained in coalition G, G i means it is service type
Si that the coalition G can provide, and Gji means that
service type Si is provided by CSPj in coalition G.
We extend the example (an entrepreneur aims to
construct an online store) described in the above section
by supposing that there are 20 CSPs connected with
each other to form a social network and provide
cloud services collaboratively in order to improve their
serving abilities and generate more profit. As shown
in Table 1, we suppose each CSP can provide at most
two service types in service type set S = fS1 , S2 , S3 ,
S4 g at one time. We say CSPi is a neighbor of CSPj
if there is an edge between CSPi and CSPj , and the
distance between CSPi and CSPj is 1 if CSPi is a
neighbor of CSPj . The degree K of a node CSPi equals
the number of edges associated with it. We assume that
the maximum degree of a node is 3.
Table 1

Serving ability of CSPs.

Problem description
CSP

We formally define some important concepts as follows:
 CSP set, CSP = fCSPj j j = 1,    , mg, contains all
CSPs that are available currently.
 Service type set, S = fSi j i = 1,    , ng, contains
all service types that the CSPs in CSP set can provide.
 SCSPj represents all services that the CSPj can
provide, in which SCSPj  S. Sji represents that service

Fig. 9

The process of an auction.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Service
S1
74
87
1
82
1
1
88
1
86
1
90
83
80
1
1
80
1
1
1
1

S2
1
71
79
1
1
72
1
1
73
1
1
79
1
1
1
1
74
76
78
1

S3
1
1
50
1
58
1
1
56
1
54
1
1
1
58
1
52
1
60
1
1

S4
1
1
1
37
32
1
1
35
1
40
1
1
40
1
31
1
36
1
1
30
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The serving ability of a CSP mainly depends on the
number of service types and the service costs provided
by the CSP. The more service types a CSP can provide,
the stronger its serving ability. Additionally, the lower
the service costs of a CSP, the stronger its serving
ability. The serving ability of all CSPs in our example is
described in Table 1, in which 1 represents that a CSP
cannot provide this type of service.
3.2

The Breadth Traversal Algorithm (BTA)

Once a CSP discovers an appropriate task and either
cannot satisfy it independently or can earn more by
forming a coalition, it will list all services it needs and
initiate a coalition. As mentioned above, we took the
communication cost in consideration when forming a
coalition to bid on a particular task. Therefore, the bid
price of the coalition involves the communication cost
when bidding on a task. In this section, we propose a
coalition formation algorithm which starts from a pCSP
node and traverses the social network in a broadcasting
manner.
Algorithm 1 describes the BTA in which a pCSP
Algorithm 1 BTA
Input: T , requests of the end-user;
Output: Coalition G (initial member is pCSP)
1: for si 2 T do
2:
if si … SpCSP then
3:
S
S [ fsi g
4:
end if
5: end for
6: flag
true
7: while flag do
8:
flag
flase
9:
B Dsend.S; CSPG /; //sends the requests to neighbors
10:
for bi 2 B do
11:
//updates the coalition
12:
if bi :Bji < Gji :price then
13:
G
.G n Gji / [ fbi g
14:
GQ
.GQ [ G i / n GQi
j

15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:

j

flag
true
CoalitionNegotiation(G); //negotiating
Q
CoalitionNegotiation.G/;
Q //adjusts the coalition
CChange.G; G/;
else
if bi :Bji < GQ ji :price then
GQ
.GQ [ fbi g/ n GQji
Q
CoalitionNegotiation.G/;
end if
end if
end for
Q //calculates the paying price
PayPrice.G; G/;
Evaluate.G/;//coalition evaluation
end while

lists all services it needs and initiates a coalition G.
Then, it broadcasts the collaborating request to its
neighbors. The CSP which receives a request from a
coalition G will bid for an appropriate task or a group of
tasks if it can earn money by providing the services. The
pCSP will determine which neighbors win the bid and
allow it to join the coalition G. Thereafter, the members
of coalition G will broadcast the other requests in the
following iterations until all services the pCSP has
listed have been found (or until a new suitable CSP
cannot be found within the deadline anymore).
In Algorithm 1, the bid prices of the members in a
coalition involve not only the cost of the service itself,
but also the communication cost between the CSP and
the pCSP. Therefore, the bid price of a CSP can be
represented as follows:
Bji D Cji C Cj  N C

i
j

(2)

In Eq. (2), Cji is the cost of the service Si provided
by CSPj , Cj is the Unit Communication Cost (UCC) of
the CSPj when communicating with the pCSP, N is the
distance between the CSPj and the pCSP, and ji is the
expected profit of CSPj when providing Si .
The communication cost can be ignored if the
distance N and the UCC Cj are small. Then, we
can also use the Multi-Objective (MO) optimization
method[13] to solve the problem. On the other hand, if
N and Cj is so large or the communication among CSP
and pCSP is so frequent we cannot ignore them, then the
communication cost must be considered when bidding
for the tasks.
3.3

The Revised Ant Colony Algorithm (RACA)

We propose a novel coalition formation algorithm
according to the ant colony algorithm[15] in this section
and the RACA is described in Algorithm 2.
In our algorithm, m is the number of ants, ant k
represents a pCSP and is responsible for finding an
appropriate partner. dji is the distance between CSPi
and CSPj . ij (t) is the amount of pheromone on the
edge (i , j ) at time t whose initial value is 0. The ant
k will traverse the social network to search for partners
for pCSP. The ant k will emit pheromone on the edge if
it finds a candidate partner for the pCSP. The ant k on
node i will visit the neighbor node j with probability
which is determined by the amount of pheromone on
.i; j / as follows:
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3.4

Algorithm 2 RACA
Input: T , requests of the end-user
Output: Coalition G (initial member is pCSP)
1: while m > 0 do
2:
mDm 1
3:
for si 2 T do
4:
//find the services that the pCSP needed
5:
if si … SpCSP then
6:
S
S [ fsi g
7:
end if
8:
end for
9:
while SG < ST and flag.G/ do
10:
//select the node according to formula(3)
k
11:
partner.Pij
/
G;
12:
update.G/; //update optimal coalition
Q //update candidate coalition
13:
update.G/;
14:
deleteNode.G/; //delete the unexpected node
15:
createE.G/; //create the edge
16:
CoalitionNegotiation.G/I //negotiating
Q
17:
CoalitionNegotiation.G/;
Q
18:
CChange.G; G/; //adjusts the coalition
19:
end while
20:
update.ij .t //; //update the pheromone
21: end while
22: deleteE.G/; //delete the temporary edge
Q //calculates the paying price
23: PayPrice.G; G/;
24: Evaluate.G/;//evaluate the coalition

Œij .t /˛ Œ1=dij ˇ
Pijk D X
; j 2 Jk
Œi u .t /˛ Œ1=di u ˇ

Negotiating among coalition members

In order to improve the probability of winning bid in
the market, the members of a coalition should negotiate
with their partners to limit the overall bid price into a
reasonable range. In fact, the process of the negotiation
is actually a process of decreasing the anticipated profit
of CSPj on its service Si or a group of services Sabci .
As mentioned above, each CSP has history data
which saves the bid prices of the previous victorious
coalitions it joined and the history data will be the basis
of future negotiations. The negotiating strategies of
the above coalition formation algorithms are similar.
In BTA and RACA, once a new CSP joins into a
coalition, it will negotiate with the existing members of
the coalition.
The process of the negotiation is shown in Fig. 10.
Once CSP1 joins the coalition, it will negotiate with
the existing CSP2 , CSP3 , and CSP4 in the coalition.
CSP1 sends its bid price to the Message Queue (MQ)
of CSP2 (the pCSP), and CSP2 will evaluate the bid
price according to its private data and historical data.
It will negotiate with CSP1 if it believes that the bid
price is too high to accept. Otherwise, it will deliver
the message (bid price of CSP1 ) through the MQ to
the next member of the coalition and append its own
bid price to the MQ. Suppose CSP3 has received the
(3)

u2Jk

The ant k will stop traversing once all of the
services the pCSP requires are found and the iteration
is completed, if and only if, all ants have stopped. The
pheromone will change with the time and the selection
of ants. The update formula can be represented as in
Eqs. (4) and (5).
ij .t C 1/ D   ij .t / C

m
X

ijk

(4)

kD1

ijk D

V .Gk /
m
X

; i; j 2 Gk
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(5)

V .Gk /

kD1

In above formula, ˛, ˇ, and  are the adjustment
parameters whose optimal values are gained through
numbers of experiments. Jk is the node set that contains
all nodes that have not been visited. Gk is the coalition
formed by ant k. V .Gk / is the overall value of coalition
Gk .

Fig. 10

The process of an auction.
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message about the bid price of CSP1 . It will send a
message (message D fBji ; Dg, D is the discount rate of
the original price, whose value usually is 0.9.) to CSP1 ,
if it deems that the bid price of CSP1 is so high that
it will negatively impact the coalition’s chance to win
the bid in the market. After negotiation between CSP1
and CSP2 , CSP1 will send the new message (fCSP1 , Si ,
D B1i g) to CSP3 , and CSP3 delivers the message to the
next member (CSP4 ) of the coalition. The negotiation
proceeds until all existing members have negotiated
with CSP1 and gained an agreement on the bid prices.
3.5

Profit distribution among coalition members

We realize profit distribution among coalition members
by revising the distribution strategy of the VCG
mechanism[16] , in which the highest bidder wins the
auction, but gets the bidding commodities with the
second highest price. In fact, our auction strategy is
a reverse Vickrey auction in which the buyer (pCSP)
selects a seller (another CSP). The buyer first presents
its preferences and calls for bids. Sellers then make
bids without having knowledge of the bids by the other
sellers (sealed-bid auction). The buyer finally selects
the best seller.
We can get the optimal coalition G = (CSP1 , CSP2 ,
Q (CSP1 ,
CSP3 , CSP5 ) and the candidate coalition G=
CSP6 , CSP8 ) from the example in Section 3.1 by
using our coalition formation algorithms. As mentioned
above, the bid price of a CSP on a service is represented
in Eq. (2) (we suppose ji D 0:3Cji , UCC is 2, and
CSP1 is the pCSP), and the bid prices of CSPs in G and
GQ are shown in Table 2.
According to the payment rules of the VCG
mechanism, we can calculate the paying price of
Table 2
CSP
CSP1

Q
Bid prices of CSPs in coalition G and G.
Service
S1
74  1:3

S3

1:3  50C
22

CSP3

1:3  32C
22

CSP5
CSP1
GQ

CSP6
CSP8

S4

1:3  71C
21

CSP2
G

S2

CSPs in G on a specific service (represented as BQji )
from Table 2. For example, BQ 22 D 1:3  71 C 2  1 is
the paying price of CSP2 for providing service S2 ,
BQ 33 D 1:3  50 C 2  2 is the paying price of CSP3 for
providing service S3 , and BQ 54 D 1:3  32 C 22 is the
paying price of CSP5 for providing service S4 .

4

In this section, six experiments have been conducted
to evaluate our market model and coalition formation
algorithms. First, we compare the proposed market
model with the existing combinatorial auction model
(where CSPs bid on a single service, individually)
in terms of economic efficiency. Then we analyze
the impact of communication costs on coalition
formation, which illustrate the necessity of considering
the communication cost when collaborating to bid.
Moreover, we analyze the relation between traverse
depth and the communication cost in the BTA
algorithm, and analyze the impact of iteration times
of RACA on the overall prices. We also conduct
experiments to compare the performance of BTA,
RACA, and the traditional ant colony algorithm to
illustrate the performance of our methods.
4.1

1:3  71C
23
1:3  56C
21

1:3  35C
21

Experiment settings

It is to be noted that we do not take the performance
overhead[17] into consideration due to the lack of real
world input data. We conduct the experiments using
synthetic data and generate the input data as follows:
100 CSPs with 1 to 10 services and 1 to 30 user
requirements are generated randomly. We assume that
each CSP can provide at most 10 services at a time
and can also collaborate with others to fulfill the
service requirements. It is possible that some CSPs
may not provide the required services. Also, the cost
of providing any independent service is randomly
generated from 100 to 600 and the total price of a
combinatorial service is 90% of the sum of the prices
of all of its member services. The ranges of UCCs for
services and the profits are set within 0–30 and 30–180,
respectively. The experiment setting details are shown
in Table 3.
4.2

74  1:3

Evaluation

Experiment results

Experiment 1 is conducted on the BTA when the
required services are fixed at 30, and the UCC increases
from 0 to 30. Figure 11 shows the results of the
experiment. The figure shows that the overall price of
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Table 3

Experiment settings.

Exp.

Req.

UCC

Cost

Algorithm

1
2
3
4
5
6

30
30
30
1
5–30
5–30

0–30
0–30
0–30
10
10
10

100–600
100–600
100–600
100–600
100–600
100–600

BTA, EAM
BTA
BTA
RACA
BTA
all

Iter.

1–20
10

our method (which adopts combinatorial auction) is
almost equal to the Existing Auction Method (EAM)
when the UCC is less than 5, but the overall price of our
method is much less than the EAM when the UCC is
greater than 5. The gap grows significantly as the UCC
increases.
Experiments 2 and 3 are conducted to analyze the
impact of communication costs on coalition formation.
As shown in Fig. 12, when the required services
are fixed at 30 and the costs are fixed at 600, the
overall prices of the coalition increase linearly with
the increase in communication costs. Figure 13 shows
the relation between the traverse depth of BTA and

Fig. 13

The relation between traverse depth and the UCC.

Efficiency of BTA compared with EAM.

the UCC. The traverse depth is up to 340 when the
unit communication cost is 0, and the traverse depth
decreases as the UCC increases from 0 to 30. It reveals
that the CSPs with lower costs and which are far away
from the pCSP, have little price advantage compared
to the CSPs in proximity to the pCSP because of the
increased communication costs.
Experiment 4 is responsible for analyzing the impact
of iteration numbers using RACA on the overall
prices. Figure 14 shows that the overall price decreases
logarithmically when the number of iterations of
RACA increases. Experiment 5 reveals the impact of
negotiation on the overall price. It can be seen from
Fig. 15 that the overall price of the coalition formation
algorithm with negotiation is lower than the algorithm
which does not feature negotiation. Experiment 6 is
conducted to compare the performance of the BTA,
RACA, and traditional ant colony algorithms. As shown
in Fig. 16, the output of RACA is better than BTA,
and the output of BTA is better than the traditional ant
colony algorithm.

The impact of communication cost on overall price.

Fig. 14 The relation between iteration numbers of RACA
and overall price.

Fig. 11

Fig. 12
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price. In our future work, we will try to implement
the prototype system based on the collaborative cloud
services platform, and evaluate the market model and
the coalition formation algorithm with real world data
to verify its economic efficiency and performance.
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